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Abstract Because of evidence of causal association
between antibiotic use and bacterial resistance, the imple-
mentation of national policies has emerged as a interesting
tool for controlling and reversing bacterial resistance. The
aim of this study was to assess the impact of public policies
on antibiotic use in Europe using a differences-in-differ-
ences approach. Comparable data on systemic antibiotics
administered in 21 European countries are available for a
11-year period between 1997 and 2007. Data on national
campaigns are drawn from the public health literature. We
estimate an econometric model of antibiotic consumption
with country fixed effects and control for the main socio-
economic and epidemiological factors. Lagged values and
the instrumental variables approach are applied to address
endogeneity aspects of the prevalence of infections and the
adoption of national campaigns. We find evidence that
public campaigns significantly reduce the use of antimi-
crobials in the community by 1.3–5.6 defined daily doses
per 1,000 inhabitants yearly. This represents an impact of
roughly 6.5–28.3 % on the mean level of antibiotic use in
Europe between 1997 and 2007. The effect is robust across
different measurement methods. Further research is needed
to investigate the effectiveness of policy interventions
targeting different social groups such as general practitio-
ners or patients.
Keywords Antibiotic use  Public policies 
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Introduction
The overuse of antibiotics is the main force driving the
increase of bacterial resistance, which represents a major
threat to public health. Antimicrobials may lose effective-
ness since they are prescribed frequently for viral infec-
tions [1] or can be obtained without an official medical
prescription [2, 3]. Large volumes of antimicrobials are
also used in agriculture and veterinary medicine, and in
many consumer products where benefits are often unclear
[4]. As illustrated in Fig. 1, differences across European
countries in antibiotic prescribing practices measured in
defined daily doses per 1,000 inhabitants (DID) partially
mirror differences in the levels of bacterial resistance
captured by the rate of penicillin-non-susceptible Strepto-
coccus pneumoniae isolates (PNSP) [5, 6].
Efforts to reduce bacterial resistance through controlled
antibiotic use include the limitation of prescriptions, sur-
veillance, and more careful use of antibiotics in agriculture.
More recently, public authorities have taken an interest in
encouraging appropriate consumption of antibiotics in the
community [7, 8]. Cost-effectiveness studies on antibiotic
treatments are now developed to consider the influence of
bacterial resistance [9]. Because the association between
antibiotic use and bacterial resistance may cross regional
borders within countries, the implementation of national
policies towards antibiotic consumption has emerged as an
important tool for controlling and reversing bacterial resis-
tance. However, the effects of these policies are still unclear.
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Several studies describe and review national policies
towards antibiotic consumption in specific countries.
Goossens et al. [10] and Chahwakilian et al. [11], for
instance, consider policies towards the efficient use of
antibiotics in Belgium and France. However, the literature
lacks studies providing empirical evidence on the impact of
national policies across Europe. Huttner et al. [12] sum-
marize the characteristics of public campaigns in high-
income countries but fail to provide sufficient statistical
evidence on their impact. An econometric approach is used
by Masiero et al. [13] to investigate socioeconomic deter-
minants of antibiotic use across Europe. The authors do not
account for the effects of public policies towards the con-
sumption of antimicrobials.
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of public
education campaigns on antibiotic use in Europe by means
of a differences-in-differences approach, a widely used
empirical methodology on the effects of various treatments
[14]. We draw information on national campaigns from the
public health literature and use publicly available data on
antibiotic consumption and socioeconomic determinants
for an 11-year period (1997–2007). We control for unob-
served individual heterogeneity by means of fixed-effects
estimations and address endogeneity aspects of infections
and policies with lagged and instrumental variables
methods.
The paper is organized as follows. The section ‘‘Public
policies aiming to reduce antibiotic consumption’’ reviews
the literature on policies towards the use of antibiotics and
provides a brief overview of public interventions
implemented in European countries. ‘‘The empirical
approach’’ proposes an econometric model of antibiotic
consumption where the impact of national campaigns is
assessed after controlling for the main determinants of con-
sumption. Data are described in the ‘‘Data’’ section. Esti-
mation results and discussion of main findings are presented
in the ‘‘Results’’ section. A ‘‘Conclusion’’ summarizes the
methodology and the main findings of our exercise, and
suggests possible improvements to current research.
Public policies aiming to reduce antibiotic consumption
Antimicrobial agents represent a scarce resource since their
effectiveness decreases with consumption because of bac-
terial resistance. Different interventions may act as an
effective way to tackle the problem. These can be char-
acterized according to the type of intervention, the geo-
graphical area involved, the targeted agents, the
instruments used and their message.
Regarding the type of intervention, policies to improve
the use of antibiotics can be categorized into four classes
according to the list proposed by Quick et al. [15]. There
are educational interventions, which are persuasive and
consider training of prescribers by means of seminars,
workshops, face to face or supervisory visits, and assorted
printed materials aimed at patients or prescribers. Mana-
gerial strategies aim at guiding decision-making; they
concentrate, for instance, on carrying drug utilization
reviews, giving cost information, following standard
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Fig. 1 Antibiotic consumption
and levels of bacterial resistance
in PNSP (proportion of
penicillin-non-susceptible
Streptococcus pneumoniae
isolates) in 21 European
countries in 2005. Data source:
European Surveillance of
Antimicrobial Consumption
(ESAC) and European
Antimicrobial Resistance
Surveillance System (EARSS)
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treatment guidelines to prescribe, and encourage comple-
tion of the full course of antibiotic therapy, for instance by
offering a full course of treatment in a single dose. Regu-
latory interventions legally constrain prescribers to control
their decision making via instruments such as registering
drugs for marketing, licensing prescribers, and limiting
prescribing or dispensing. Finally, economic interventions
aim at providing financial incentives to institutions, pro-
viders and patients. The effects of these strategies crucially
depend on the pricing structure, the price setting and the
reimbursement mechanism adopted.
Among the educational strategies that promote the
appropriate use of antibiotics and raise public awareness of
bacterial resistance, public campaigns are one of the most
widely used. In European countries, national or regional
health authorities are in charge of adopting these cam-
paigns, depending on the level of decentralization of health
care systems. Although antibiotic policies can be imple-
mented at national or subnational level, public campaigns
are generally implemented within a national strategy to
abate resistance to antimicrobials [12]. International orga-
nizations are sometimes involved. Rudholm [16] suggests
that the problem of resistance is a global one. Conse-
quently, optimal policies should consider the fact that
antibiotic resistance can cross country borders and travel
far distances. Coast et al. [17] argue that policies aimed at
reducing antibiotic use within a country may not work in
another country since local epidemiological factors affect
the spreading mechanism of antibiotic resistance. Gonza´lez
Ortiz and Masiero [18] suggest that regional policies could
blunt the impact of policies in neighbouring regions
through the generation of local spillovers.
As observed by Huttner et al. [12], the majority of
public campaigns are addressed to the general public,
focusing on parents of young children. Health-care pro-
fessionals, specifically primary care physicians, are also
targeted. The public is targeted by distributing informa-
tional material to patients and by displaying posters in
waiting rooms and pharmacies. General practitioners
receive educational material such as guidelines, informa-
tion sheets and booklets. Some campaigns combine dif-
ferent instruments such as advertising on television and
radio networks, newspapers and public transports, through
the internet or using billboards. The use of the internet to
spread information about the program is common to almost
all campaigns.
Finally, regarding the message of the intervention,
Huttner et al. [12] explain that most campaigns attempt to
inform the public that antibiotics are not needed for treat-
ing viral infections. They focus on respiratory tract infec-
tions and combine negative and positive messages. The
main message is that bacterial resistance is a major public
health issue caused largely by the misuse of antibiotics.
This encourages people to follow rigorously the antibiotic
dosage regime prescribed by their physician.
Previous studies on the impact of antibiotic policies
The literature on the impact of antibiotic policies is limited
to studies using a descriptive and qualitative approach.
Goossens et al. [10] analyse national campaigns in two
European countries—Belgium and France—with high
antibiotic use between 1997 and 2003.1 To assess the
impact of antibiotic policies, the authors compare rates of
antibiotic consumption between the two countries and
England, where the rates of antibiotic use are lower and
persistent. Findings suggest evidence of reduced antibiotic
prescribing in both countries. However, these findings
cannot be generalised to countries with lower or already
declining levels of antibiotic use. Moreover, the study does
not control for differences between the two countries
related to the impact of infections, the characteristics of
prescribers or demographic aspects over the time period
considered.
To assess the impact of antibiotic policies in Central and
Eastern European countries, Cizman et al. [19] administer
a questionnaire to national representatives. The question-
naire includes information about national antimicrobial
resistance surveillance, national consumption of antibiotics
in the community and in hospitals, and strategies to opti-
mize the use of antimicrobials. The authors identify
countries that have restricted the use of some antibiotics for
outpatients and inpatients and describe briefly other types
of interventions implemented by these countries. Findings
show that only few countries have restricted the use of
antimicrobials in ambulatory care, as compared to the
common practice of restricting the use of antibiotics in
hospitals. The authors realise that antibiotic policy inter-
ventions are lacking or apply only to specific interventions
or problems.
Using an exhaustive search strategy and structured
interviews, Huttner et al. [12] classify and examine the
characteristics and outcomes of 22 public campaigns for a
more rational use of antibiotics implemented at national or
regional level in high-income countries between 1990 and
2007. The majority (16) of these campaigns are located in
Europe. Looking at data on the consumption of outpatient
antibiotics, the authors try to evaluate the effect of the
campaigns. The study concludes that there is probably a
relationship between a decline in the use of antibiotics and
the implementation of public campaigns. However, this
1 For more evidence on the impact of the French campaign to reduce
inappropriate use of antibiotics, see also the recent study by
Chahwakilian et al. [11], who analyse trends in antibiotic prescrip-
tions between 1980 and 2009.
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conclusion is based on a qualitative analysis rather than on
a statistical or econometric analysis. The approach has
some shortcomings since most campaigns do not include a
control population and trends in consumption before the
interventions are not considered. The analysis cannot
clarify whether antibiotic consumption would still have
increased without the campaign or if the duration of the
intervention was too short to observe measurable effects.
In conclusion, evidence presented in empirical studies
on the impact of antibiotic policies is currently weak,
mainly based on descriptive statistics and graphical anal-
ysis. In the following section, we will use an econometric
approach to provide more convincing evidence of the
association between the adoption of antibiotic policies and
antibiotic consumption rates.
The empirical approach
To investigate the effects of national campaigns for a more
rational use of antibiotics, we estimate a model of outpatient
antibiotic consumption using a panel data set for a sample of
21 European countries over the period 1997–2007. The
model serves as a reduced form that considers both demand-
and supply-side factors. In our simple frame, individuals are
assumed to follow doctors’ prescriptions and to be compliant
with the antibiotic therapy.2 We hypothesize that the con-
sumption of outpatient antibiotics depends upon sociode-
mographic characteristics of the population, individuals’
health status, antibiotic price, the characteristics of health
care supply and the adoption of national campaigns to
improve the use of antibiotics.
Antibiotic prescribing practices vary widely across
European countries. Mean figures of defined daily doses
per 1,000 inhabitants for 21 countries collected by the
European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Consumption
(ESAC) project between 1997 and 2007 show that France,
Greece, and Luxembourg, among others, exhibit signifi-
cantly higher values of antibiotic use than Austria,
Denmark, and the Netherlands (see Figs. 2, 3; Tables 3, 4
in the ‘‘Appendix’’).3 Some of these countries implemented
policy interventions to reduce antibiotic consumption dur-
ing the period considered; other countries did not adopt any
type of public campaign.4 Figure 3 provides an illustration
of the adoption of national campaigns to improve antibiotic
use in Europe. We refer the reader to the ‘‘Data’’ section
for details about the construction of this figure.
Since we have information on antibiotic consumption
before and after a policy instrument has been introduced, we
are able to estimate the effect of policy interventions using a
differences-in-differences (DD) approach [14].5 The general
idea of this approach is to compare the outcome—in our case
the per capita consumption of antibiotics—of two groups of
countries before and after the introduction of a campaign.
One group, denoted the ‘‘control’’, is composed of countries
that did not introduce any policy instrument to reduce anti-
biotic consumption. The other group, the ‘‘treatment’’,
includes all countries that have adopted some policy mea-
sures. The control group and the treatment group change in
each year since countries did not implement campaigns at the
same time. Looking at differences in the outcomes observed
between the two groups after the introduction of a policy, we
can then estimate the impact of antibiotic policy interven-
tions. The typical DD estimation with panel data with more
than two periods considers countries and years fixed effects.
Therefore, our estimation method exploits both the within-
country variation as well as the comparison between coun-
tries, and takes into account unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity.
Our empirical approach draws from Giavazzi and
Tabellini [23], who apply a DD technique to a large sample
of countries to investigate the impact of economic and
political liberalizations on economic performance, macro-
economic policy and structural policies. We estimate the
following model in the whole sample of treated and control
countries:
DIDit ¼ b  POLICYit þ /  xit þ xi þ mt þ eit; ð1Þ
where DIDit denotes defined daily doses of antibiotic
consumption per 1,000 inhabitants in country i at time t;
2 Antibiotic consumption data generally derive from reimbursement
data or distribution/sales data, depending on the method for measur-
ing antibiotic use employed by each national database. Assuming
patient’s non-compliance to be a negligible factor implies that the
quantity of antibiotics sold matches the quantity actually consumed.
The latter is associated to antimicrobial resistance and represents the
target of antibiotic policies.
3 Data are reliable and exhibit a good degree of comparability since
the ESAC network screens for detection bias in sample and census
data, bias by over-the counter sales and parallel trade, errors in
assigning medicinal product packages to the Anatomical Therapeutic
Chemical Classification (ATC), and errors in calculations of defined
daily doses [20].
4 Public campaigns and policies are used interchangeably throughout
the remaining of the paper. The reader should be aware that public
campaigns represent a subset of possible antibiotic policies. The
Netherlands, for instance, have strong antibiotic policies in place
although the country did not conduct any public campaign during the
study period.
5 In the literature, several approaches are discussed to estimate the
causal impact of a ‘‘treatment variable’’ on an outcome variable, such
as the DD estimator and the propensity score matching estimator. In
this study, we use a differences-in-differences approach because of
the relatively small panel data set with observations at the country
level rather than at individual level. Using a propensity score
matching approach requires, for instance, a large data set regarding
the number of variables and the sample size. For a discussion on this
issue, we refer the reader to studies by Frolich [21] and Heinrich et al.
[22].
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POLICYit is a dummy variable that assumes a value equal
to 1 only in the year of policy implementation, and 0
otherwise. xit is a vector of other covariates that includes
the per capita national income (Yit), physician density
(DPHit), the percentage of the population below 14 years
of age, between 15 and 24, 25 and 64, 65 and 79, and over
80 (POP1it. . . POP5it), the price level of pharmaceuticals
(Pit), and the population health status measured by the
impact of infectious diseases (INFit). xi captures the
country-level fixed effects, which are assumed constant
over time and take unobserved time-invariant variables,
such as cultural aspects, into account. mt is the year-specific
fixed effect, which is assumed constant across countries.
Finally, eit is an unobserved error term with Z distribution.
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Fig. 2 Outpatient antibiotic use
in DID (defined daily doses per
1000 inhabitants per day) for
countries that did not implement
any public campaign between
1997 and 2007. Data source:
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Note that model (1) is a common generalization of the most
basic DD setup, which is valid under the restrictive
assumption that changes in the consumption of antibiotics
over time would have been the same in both treatment and
control groups in the absence of the campaign.
By including both time and country fixed effects in
Eq. (1), we are able to disentangle the impact of public
campaigns per se from other determinants related to
country characteristics or time effects.6 The main coeffi-
cient of interest is b, which measures the effect of public
campaigns on antibiotic consumption. A negative and
significant coefficient would suggest that antibiotic policies
were effective in reducing antibiotic consumption over the
period 1997–2007.
To correctly identify the impact of antibiotic policy
interventions, the econometric model has to satisfy some
assumptions. First, we need to exclude the presence of
unobserved variables affecting antibiotic consumption that
move systematically over time in a different way between
the two groups of countries. This does not exclude obser-
vation of individual patterns within each group. Although
in our analysis all countries belong to Europe, the general
trend in antibiotic consumption may not be the same.
Indeed, European countries showed different trends even in
the absence of campaigns. However, we do not observe
different geographical or political clusters between the two
groups of countries.
The possibility of unobserved heterogeneity bias may not
be negligible even though our regressions include important
socioeconomic determinants of differences in antibiotic use
across countries (xit), such as income, the population age
structure, and density of practitioners. Generally, unob-
served heterogeneities in the use of antibiotics among
countries, such as cultural factors, are notoriously difficult to
measure and may also be present (see, for instance, the
studies by Borg [24], Deschepper et al. [25] and Harbarth
et al. [26]). Although we cannot account explicitly for cul-
tural aspects, the fixed-effects approach should consider
these effects at least partially. Moreover, if cultural differ-
ences between the two groups of countries—with and
without policies—are stable over time, the estimated effect
of public campaigns should not be biased.
One further assumption that will be relaxed later in the
analysis is that the decision to introduce a public campaign
is independent of the level of antibiotic consumption in a
country, i.e. policies are exogenous. This implies that
pressure to promote information campaigns does not
depend directly on antibiotic consumption. More likely, it
depends on the increasing levels of antibiotic resistance.
Still, this is a limitation since antibiotic resistance is caused
partially by the consumption of antibiotics, which may then
influence indirectly the adoption of antibiotic policies.
Moreover, the link between antibiotic use and antimicro-
bial resistance is now well documented and we cannot
exclude that some countries may have conducted cam-
paigns because of high levels of antibiotic consumption.
From an econometric point of view, if campaigns are non-
random and occur more frequently where the chance of
success is higher, then the estimate of the average treatment
effect may be biased. As mentioned before, we control for
this unobserved heterogeneity by means of a FE approach
with clusters by country. However, the above relationship
between antimicrobial resistance and antibiotic consumption
generates an endogeneity problem, which may also lead to
biased results in the estimation of Eq. (1). For this reason,
we check the robustness of our initial results (Model 1) by
endogenizing the policy variable using an instrumental
variable approach (Model 2). As we will discuss later, the use
of instrumental variables decreases the number of observa-
tions. The density of foreign population and the production
of milk and pig meat are used as instruments for policies.
These variables also measure indirectly the level of bacterial
resistance within a country. Masiero et al. [13] observe that
these instruments are well correlated with bacterial resis-
tance. Levels of bacterial resistance can be related to the
extensive use of antibiotics in agriculture and in animal
breeding. For instance, Campylobacter is the most fre-
quently reported zoonotic pathogen to cause human illness,
and resistant bacteria tend to be harboured in meat produced
commercially [27]. The common practice of using milk
produced during antibiotic treatment for feeding calves and
pigs causes a marked selection for resistant bacterial strains
(i.e. enterococci), which may enter the food chain. Finally,
the density of foreign population may be considered an
indicator of human population movements across countries,
which increases the spread of bacterial resistance [16]. In
contrast to bacterial resistance, our instrumental variables
are correlated poorly with antibiotic use. Consequently, we
believe they can reasonably be used as appropriate instru-
ments for policies.
Another explanatory variable is potentially endogenous
in our model: population health status, which is captured
by mortality for infectious diseases. Infections are
potentially endogenous since a low level of antibiotic use
may favour poorer health conditions in the population,
e.g. increased spread of severe infections. To tackle this
problem, we estimate our models using the lagged mor-
tality rate for infectious diseases (INFit-1 instead of
INFit). This is a simple, but fairly effective, instrumental
variable approach. The variation within the observations
of each country for this variable is in general as large as
the variation in other covariates and higher than
the within-variation in the consumption of antibiotics.
6 Initially, we also estimate Eq. (1) using ordinary least-squares
(OLS) and random effects (RE) approaches.
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For robustness check, we also estimate our models using
a two-period lagged mortality rate for infectious diseases.
The main results are confirmed. Finally, we can rule out
possible endogeneity regarding the price variable (Pit)
since this is constructed by combining the harmonized
annual average price index for pharmaceuticals (HICP)
and the comparative price level index (PLI), as explained
later in ‘‘Data’’.
One last issue is that the DD estimation results can be
affected by positive serial correlation. Although this cor-
relation does not bias the estimated average treatment
effect, it could lead us to underestimate the standard error
and to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of public
campaigns. To cope with this problem, we report standards
errors clustered by country.7 Note also that the variation
over time in our data is not negligible and represents
around 30 % of total variation.
Data
The consumption rate of antibiotics is available for 21
European countries between 1997 and 2007. This is col-
lected by the European Surveillance of Antimicrobial
Consumption (ESAC) project. The consumption rate is
expressed most commonly as the number of defined daily
doses (DDD) per 1,000 inhabitants per day (DID). The
DDD is a technical unit based on the assumed average
maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main
indication in adults. Antibiotic use is standardized using the
ATC/DDD index for international drug consumption
studies [30].8
Annual data available on the determinants of outpatient
antibiotic use are summarised in Table 1. Details for each
country are provided in Tables 3 and 4 in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
These determinants include socioeconomic characteristics
of the population (income and demographic structure),
supply-side factors (density of doctors), price of pharma-
ceuticals, and the incidence of bacterial infections
measured by the rate of mortality.9 We use the mortality
rate for infectious diseases as a proxy for the incidence of
infections since morbidity indicators are less complete and
reliable.
Data are obtained from a variety of sources. Information
on the per capita income (measured in US dollars in pur-
chasing power parity), the density of physicians, and the
incidence of infections are extracted from publications by
the OECD [32].10 The demographic structure of the pop-
ulation is derived from Eurostat tables [33]. Information on
instruments for policies (population density, production of
milk and pig meat) are also obtained from the Eurostat
statistics [33].
Since antibiotic prices are not easily available for all
countries and years, we approximate price levels for anti-
biotics using the pharmaceutical price index. This is clearly
a more general price index as compared to the antibiotic
price index. Still, antibiotics represent a considerable part
of all pharmaceutical sales and their prices are likely well
correlated with the pharmaceutical price index in all
countries. The harmonized annual average price index for
pharmaceutical products (HICP) provided by Eurostat [33]
includes information on price trends for pharmaceuticals
for each country between 2000 and 2005, where 2005 =
100. Since this price index is equal to 100 for all countries
in 2005, we rescale the pharmaceutical index of each
country using the comparative price level index (PLI)
which varies across countries. The PLI indicates the price
level of each country compared to the average price level
of the 25 EU countries in 2005. Using this index is
equivalent to assuming that differences in pharmaceutical
prices across countries reflect differences in the general
level of prices.
As for public campaigns, data collection is cumbersome
and may result in incomplete data. Moreover, little infor-
mation is available in scientific journals. For our purpose,
we draw the information on campaign characteristics from
the recent review by Huttner et al. [12]. The authors
identify public campaigns implemented at national level in
high income countries between 1990 and 2007. Using
information from this study, we generate a dummy variable
(POLICY1) which takes a value equal to 1 in the year of
implementation of the campaign, and 0 in the pre-cam-
paign and post-campaign years (see Fig. 3). As an example,
7 As discussed by Bertrand et al. [14], conventional differences-in-
differences standard errors may be biased because of serial correla-
tion. A solution proposed by Arellano [28] is to compute cluster-
robust standard errors. Kezdi [29] shows that cluster-robust estimates
perform well in typical-sized panels, although they can be biased
slightly downward if the number of countries is very small. In a
Monte Carlo experiment, Kezdi [29] considers N = 10 to be a very
small number of countries. In our case, N is equal to 20. Therefore,
although the sample is relatively small, we believe that cluster-robust
standard errors represent a viable solution to autocorrelation.
8 Although comparing antibiotic use among countries using DDD has
a large consensus among researchers, one limitation is that this
measure is not appropriate for all age groups. Indeed, using other
measures may give different results, as illustrated by Goossens et al.
[31].
9 Information on mortality for infectious diseases and price of
pharmaceuticals are not available for all countries or years. This
reduces the total number of observations in our final regressions.
10 It is important to underline that this variable is obtained from
OECD data and is likely difficult to compare between countries.
Mortality for infectious diseases is generally based on diagnostic
discharge codes. Consequently, differences among countries may
depend on different methods of determining this variable.
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consider a single country, for instance Belgium. Huttner
et al. [12] register that this country implemented a national
campaign from 2000, except in winter 2003–2004. Con-
sequently, our policy dummy assumes value 1 between
2000 and 2002 and between 2004 and 2007, and 0 in 2003.
Alternatively, we consider a different policy indicator
(POLICY2). This is a dummy variable that takes the value 1
in the years of campaign adoption and in the years post-
campaign, and 0 in years before the campaign is adopted.
To complete our example, the policy dummy (POLICY2)
for Belgium takes the value 1 in all years from 2000 until
2007. The construction of these indicators has been facil-
itated by some similar characteristics of the campaigns
such as their main message. However, as shown by Huttner
et al. [12], other characteristics (e.g. the intensity of the
campaigns) may vary significantly, which is not taken into
account by our policy measures. We are also aware that
our policy indicators may suffer from other limitations
discussed in the review by Huttner et al. [12]. Some
campaigns were not included in the review due to limita-
tions in the search method or available information. Since
we focus on national campaigns, we exclude campaigns
implemented at regional level within a country (e.g. Emilia
Romagna for Italy). Moreover, we cannot exclude that
some countries adopted strategies other than public cam-
paigns to reduce antibiotic consumption. Although we are
aware of possible missing data to correctly identify all
types of campaigns, these missing policies could be highly
heterogeneous and, consequently, hardly measurable by
means of appropriate variables. However, we do not see
specific reasons why excluded campaigns should affect the
control group of countries differently from the treatment
group.
Since almost all countries implemented some policies to
increase public awareness of antibiotic use from 2000, and
in order to have a satisfactory control group, we excluded
Iceland from the final dataset. Iceland adopted a campaign
at the beginning of the period considered (1997 and 1998).
The final dataset is an unbalanced panel dataset with 153
observations for Model 1 and 122 observations for Model
2. Since information on instrumental variables for policies
is not available for all countries or years, the number
of observations in Model 2 is lower. Estimations are
performed by means of the statistical software STATA
(version 11.1) developed by the StataCorp LP (College
Station, TX).
Table 1 Variables notation and summary statistics for the whole period (1997–2007) for the 20 countries considered in the econometric analysis
Description Variables N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Outpatient antibiotic consumption DDDs per 1,000 inhabitants per day (DID) 207 19.77 5.96 9.75 34.73
Income per capita Per capita GDP in US $ in PPP (Y) 220 26,582.70 10,538.74 8,898 71,400
Price of pharmaceuticals Comparative price levels for
pharmaceutical products (P)
187 92.82 21.22 36.65 135.81
Demographic structure
of population
Proportion of population under 14 (POP1) 220 17.53 2.12 13.90 25.70
Proportion of population 15–24 (POP2) 220 13.20 1.83 10.20 17.50
Proportion of population 25–64 (POP3) 220 54.02 1.81 47.90 58.10
Proportion of population 65–79 (POP4) 220 11.69 1.46 8.20 15.20
Proportion of population over 80 (POP5) 220 3.57 0.83 1.80 5.40
Density of doctors Number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants (DPH) 220 3.20 0.67 1.85 5.35
Infections Mortality rate for infectious diseases (INF) 189 6.89 3.47 2.00 20.10
Density of foreign population Foreign residents per km2 215 6.24 7.93 0.09 41.64
Animal production Cow’s milk (in thousand of tons) 217 6,557.08 7,303.11 254.64 28,723.91
Number of pigs (in thousand) 216 7,492.50 7,743.45 73.72 27,113
Years Number of countries with data
on antibiotic consumption
1997 15
1998 18
1999–2005 20
2006–2007 17
DDDs defined daily doses, GDP gross domestic product, PPP purchasing power parity
Data sources: European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Consumption (ESAC), OECD, Eurostat, and European Observatory of Health Systems and
Policies
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Results
Our initial tests indicate that the OLS model can be
rejected in favour of the fixed effects (FE) model.11 The
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test indicates
that there are other effects than those captured by the
exogenous variables in OLS regressions. The F test that
constant terms are homogeneous across regions and time
periods is also rejected. Moreover, the Hausman test
suggests that the FE approach should be preferred to the
random effects approach. The parameter estimates
obtained using the DD estimator are reported in Table 2
(Model 1). Table 2 also reports the results of the two-
stage least squares regression (Model 2) to correct for
endogeneity.
As explained in ‘‘The empirical approach’’, all
regressions include country fixed effects and year dummy
variables. The results are stable and no structural differ-
ences were observed across the two models. Time dum-
mies do not show any significant increase in the use of
outpatient antibiotics per capita over time. In both models
some coefficients are statistically significant and carry the
expected sign. The relatively low number of statistically
significant coefficients of socioeconomic variables could
be explained, as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi [34],
by the low within variation of these variables. The
number of significant coefficients increases in the two-
stage least squares model. Although this is worth noting,
we remind the reader that our main goal is to estimate the
coefficient of the policy dummy variable using a DD
approach.
Effects of policies
The effects of antibiotic policies on outpatient antibiotic
consumption are reported in Table 2. As explained in ‘‘The
empirical approach’’ section, the control group consists of
all the countries that did not undertake a public campaign
to improve antibiotic use during 1997–2007. Thus, when
we study the effects of public campaigns, the controls are
the countries that did not adopt any campaign. We remind
the reader that our control and treatment groups can change
in each year since countries did not implement campaigns
at the same time. Moreover, our estimation method exploits
both the within-country variation as well as the comparison
between groups.
The variable POLICY1 is a dummy variable equal to 1
in the year of adoption of the campaign and 0 afterwards
for the treated countries only. Its estimated coefficient
captures the average effect of the policy. In line with our
expectations, policy coefficients are significant in both
models. The dummy variable shows a negative sign,
which suggests that the implementation of public cam-
paigns leads to a reduction in the use of antibiotics. One
could speculate that individuals informed about the social
implications of antibiotic use are more likely to use
antibiotics carefully.12
Using the estimated coefficients of POLICY1 in Model 1
and Model 2, we observe that the implementation of a
public campaign may reduce antibiotic consumption by
1.3–5.6 defined daily doses per 1,000 inhabitants. This
represents an impact of roughly 6.5–28.3 % on the mean
level of antibiotic use in Europe between 1997 and 2007.
Our results cannot be compared easily with earlier
findings in the literature. There is no comparable study
we are aware of on the association between outpatient
antibiotic use and public campaigns. The few papers that
have investigated the correlation between antibiotic pol-
icies and antibiotic use either focus on specific countries
or do not use quantitative methods, as presented in
‘‘Public policies aiming to reduce antibiotic consump-
tion’’ section.
Other effects of covariates
The coefficient on physician density deserves some com-
ment since it is positive and significant in Model 2. An
increase in physician density by 0.1 % increases antibiotic
consumption by 3.13 DID. This result might suggest some
evidence of supply-induced demand. However, the
assumption of a positive relationship between the amount
of prescriptions and the number of doctors per capita does
not necessarily follow. It is known that countries with a
greater number of doctors per inhabitant use more
11 Preliminary OLS regressions show an R2 adjusted of 0.59. The
goodness-of-fit increases slightly with the inclusion of temporal
dummy variables. The F test is 24.58 (12.51 with time dummies).
This suggests that overall regressors has a significant impact on the
dependent variable. Moreover, the mean variance inflation factor is
lower than 3. Finally, the Shapiro-Wilk test as well as the Jarque-Bera
test for normality of errors cannot be rejected using the conventional
95 % level of significance.
12 The results are confirmed if we include in the model the dummy
variable POLICY2 instead of POLICY1. This takes a value equal to 1
in the years of campaign adoption as well as in the years post-
campaign. The rationale of this indicator is that policies may take
some time to show their effects or may have carryover effects.
Although POLICY1 seems to reflect more closely information
collected in the review by Huttner et al. [12], POLICY2 may provide
a robustness check of our results based on POLICY1. Since countries
in the treatment group are assumed to implement policies for longer
periods under POLICY2 than under POLICY1, the effect of policies
could be biassed. We find that the estimated coefficients of POLICY2
are slightly less significant than the coefficients of POLICY1, which
confirms the results and may suggest that policies have carryover
effects beyond the year of policy implementation.
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antibiotics than countries with a smaller number of doctors
per inhabitant [35], and that doctors who spend more time
with their patients prescribe fewer antibiotics [36].
Although physicians are more informed than patients
about drug resistance and are ethically constrained to
avoid unnecessary antibiotics, they may overprescribe
antimicrobials either to meet patient’s expectations or
because they fear misdiagnosing bacterial infections [37].
Patients usually regard antibiotics as a valid alternative to
anti-inflammatory drugs for colds or flu. They also suffer
from poor information in relation to physicians and look
for evidence of physician’s quality. The physician’s
willingness to prescribe antibiotics may then appear as a
mark of quality [38]. Patients may favour immediate
treatment and the physician must decide between pre-
scribing or persuading the patient that a delay is
appropriate.
We found no significant effect of changes in average
national income. Nevertheless, the coefficient of income is
positive in both regressions. Positive income effects for
antimicrobials are observed by Baye et al. [39] using US
data, Filippini et al. [40] using aggregated Swiss data at
small area level, and in a previous study on European
country data with a shorter time period than ours, i.e.
2000–2005 [13]. Conversely, negative income effects are
found by Filippini et al. [41] using Swiss data at Cantonal
level. One possible explanation for the relatively low value
of the coefficient of income is that the increasing concern
on the effects of bacterial resistance from the 1990s may
have reduced income elasticity of outpatient antibiotic
expenditure over time. Another explanation is that high-
income countries are more likely to substitute other treat-
ments for antibiotics, ceteris paribus.
The pharmaceutical price index is not significant. Gen-
erally, antibiotics are perceived as necessary in the case of
presumed bacterial infections. Furthermore, antibiotics are
purchased under doctor’s prescription and the price
share borne directly by the patient is usually very low.
Table 2 Parameter estimates for differences-in-differences models of antibiotic consumption
Variables
Model 1 (fixed effects) Model 2 (2SLS)
N = 153 N = 148
Coefficient SE P value Coefficient SE P value
Constant 14.23987 10.84761 0.205 – – –
Y -0.000006 0.000076 0.937 0.000034 0.000104 0.742
INFt-1 -0.026964 0.131664 0.840 0.133130 0.159960 0.405
DPH 2.675357 1.745052 0.142 2.037980 1.287773 0.114
POP1 -0.149416 0.315799 0.642 0.939162 0.725505 0.195
POP2 -0.504244 0.330286 0.143 -0.518750 0.269742 0.054
POP4 1.739930 0.347879 0.000 1.732788 0.423205 0.000
POP5 -2.234688 1.780598 0.225 -0.977550 1.484881 0.510
P -0.047670 0.035893 0.200 -0.049779 0.041672 0.232
POLICY1 -1.278340 0.569823 0.037 -5.601114 2.320015 0.016
dt1 -0.665328 1.892860 0.729 -3.036271 2.490521 0.223
dt2 -1.319394 1.816378 0.476 -3.069590 2.242963 0.171
dt3 -1.579900 1.647785 0.350 -2.352010 1.796504 0.190
dt4 -1.062183 1.482873 0.483 -1.564164 1.528752 0.306
dt5 -1.516438 1.239671 0.236 -1.655402 1.324945 0.212
dt6 -1.278312 0.944794 0.192 -1.682968 1.067949 0.115
dt7 -1.827697 0.770119 0.028 -1.606953 0.800390 0.045
dt8 -0.848300 0.661260 0.215 -1.095777 0.693138 0.114
dt9 -1.381653 0.505751 0.013 -0.811843 0.537460 0.131
ru 5.900249 – – – – –
re 1.152637 – – – – –
q 0.963240 – – – – –
Y Income per capita, INFt-1 mortality for infectious diseases lagged one year, DPH density of doctors, POP1 population under 14, POP2
population 15–24, POP4 population 65–79, POP5 population over 80, P price of pharmaceuticals, POLICY1 implementation of public
campaigns, dt1- dt9 time dummies, rj standard deviation of common residuals, re standard deviation of unique (individual) residuals, q variance
not explained by differences across entities
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Even without insurance coverage, the cost to the patient
would be low since most antibiotics are relatively cheap
and have to be taken for a short time. This may imply that
individuals are not very responsive to changes in antibiotic
prices, although price demand elasticities may also vary
according to the type of antibiotic therapy, e.g., newer and
more expensive antibiotics are more price elastic than
traditional ones [42].
The coefficients of mortality rate for infectious diseases
are not significant. As for demographic covariates, we
observe only a significant association between the pro-
portion of individuals aged 65–79 and increasing levels of
antimicrobial consumption. This result seems to support
the hypothesis that increasing prevalence of chronic health
problems as people grow older may determine an increase
in the utilization of health care goods and services,
including drugs. Di Matteo and Grootendorst [43] also
observe a slightly significant increase in drug expenditure
in the population between 64 and 74, although the evidence
is not confirmed by the more recent study by Di Matteo
[44].
Conclusion
Several studies show that a decrease in the use of antibi-
otics may reduce levels of bacterial resistance. During the
last decade, many European countries undertook public
health programs to optimise antibiotic use in the commu-
nity. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of policies encourag-
ing a rational use of antibiotics is still unclear. In
particular, the influence of public campaigns on antimi-
crobial usage, and therefore on bacterial resistance, has not
been assessed accurately [12].
In this paper, we estimated the impact of antibiotic
policies in Europe by means of a differences-in-differences
methodology. The approach allowed us to identify the
effect of campaigns on antibiotic use by relating differ-
ential changes in antibiotic consumption across countries
and over time to changes in the relevant policy variables.
The results provide some evidence that public cam-
paigns represent an effective strategy to reduce the use of
outpatient antibiotics. Countries that adopt public cam-
paigns succeed in terms of reducing their levels of anti-
biotic use over time. Further research is necessary to
assess the impact of policy interventions on the levels of
bacterial resistance through the reduction of antibiotic
consumption.
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